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In a post today, Mike Konczal posits a convincing narrative of how the extremes of today’s political Left and Right differ (“Why don’t liberals have their own tea party?”). He bases his description on “three core traits”- ideology, infrastructure, and the reaction of the respective parties’ mainstream elites to pressure from the extremes. He describes the far Right as adhering to a hard-core ideology; they have a proven record of forcing moderate Republican candidates to the right (remember Mitt Romney, the “severe conservative”?). The past forty years have witnessed the growth of “an entire infrastructure of donors and policy and business interests [in an effort] to build a proper conservative movement.” He illustrates this by pointing out the differences between the activist Heritage Foundation and the less-politically involved, left-leaning Center for American Progress.

This is essentially a story with which we are familiar. What may surprise some is Konczal’s conclusion: Namely, “it is entirely unclear whether liberals should even want their own equivalent to the tea party.” He bases this conclusion on recent history: Democrats, when in the majority, have enacted major legislation, something the Republicans have not been able to accomplish.

While I agree in most part with Konczal’s rendition, I would append to it some other factors which have contributed to the current political dysfunction. For one, the Republican Party is moving towards permanent minority status, and has consequently adopted the rear-guard delaying tactics of an army in retreat. They have done this to great effect, which brings me to point two: The Right has, since Obama’s election, won the messaging battles. Public discourse since 2009 has snaked from stimulus to health-care reform to deficit reduction. It is stunning that, in the aftermath of the second greatest financial crisis in our history, the Republicans have ignored the lack of economic growth and the persistence of high employment to rail about the deficit and big government. The debacle of the Affordable Care Act rollout is a prime example: Right-wing groups, and, in some cases, the Republican Party itself, have spent vast sums to inform the public that the ACA cannot work while not offering alternatives themselves). At the same time, the economy is making glacial progress (forecasts for 2014 project annual GDP growth of about 2.6%) and unemployment is at 7%. The genius of the tea party phenomenon is that it harnessed, in the wake of the 2008 financial collapse, an anger-at-government popularism to the political fortunes of the GOP. Five years later, we have disgruntled anti-bailout types comingled with rabid cultural warriors.

Finally, the diversity among Democrats is a factor Konczal acknowledges works against a disciplined approach to policy. While the tensions among the various constituencies of the Democratic coalition are not nearly as dramatic as the fissures that now threaten the GOP, progressivism in this country encompasses a much broader range of policy and politics. As a matter of speculation, it seems to me that, even with a Democratic Congress, the progressive agenda was only advanced when there was strong Presidential leadership (FDR, LBJ).

There has been a concerted attempt by conservative elements over the past several decades to establish the underlying myth that the United States is a “center-right” society. I am not so sure that this should be accepted out-of-hand. Konczal points out that many self-identified conservatives are supportive of social safety net programs and public education. People are against "big government" when it is working in the interests of someone who is not them.

The ultimate goal must be for government to be the source of pragmatic policies. That will never occur until the electorate demands more from our political leaders. In turn, that will never happen until the electorate demands more of itself.